"libertarian fairy tales" (p. 216).
In classical liberal grammar, rights, whether functioning or merely proposed, whether upheld by legal apparatus or by voluntary mechanisms such as shunning, are divided into the negative and the positive. Negative rights of property, consent and contract -a composite known as liberty -stand opposed to interference by government or other potentially coercive parties. Positive rights correspond to prescribed, recognized claims on government resources, such as government efforts at protecting property and welfare-state benefits (e.g., due access to government roads, schools, and subsidies). David Hume and Adam Smith thought this way, though they did not use the terms "negative" and "positive." The essential claim of classical liberalism (or libertarianism) is that negative-rights violation by government (including taxation) is far too extensive.
2
That claim is not engaged by Holmes and Sunstein. Instead, they try to dispose of the classical liberal grammar. They make arguments that depend on familiar but faulty suppositions, such as that gray areas in property and contract destroy the distinction between voluntary and coercive actions (pp. 67-69) and that classical liberals necessarily oppose entirely positive rights, or are anarchists (e.g., p. 72), even though the libertarians they actually name (Murray, Boaz, Robert Nozick, and Richard Epstein) do not embrace or advocate the anarchist position. But their chief argument is that because negative rights are attached to positive claims to government protection efforts, there is no real distinction between negative and positive rights. The authors seem to recognize no conceptual distinction between property rights, rights to government schooling, or minimum wage laws. As the title of the first chapter asserts, "All Rights Are
Positive."
The authors suppose that the observation of property rights necessarily or mainly depends on government protection efforts: "Without such governmental powers, rights would have no Holmes and Sunstein seem to imply that there has to be a court behind every court. They identify the essence of a right to be attached claims to effective government enforcement, such that "vulnerable individuals must have relatively easy access to a second, higher-level set of government actors" (p. 54). They do not seem to recognize that such reasoning generates a regress, and prompts the question, how is the regress resolved? is 'theirs'" (pp. 66, 230). One wonders if that most important form of property held by each of us -our own person -is also to be considered "ours" only in a diminutive sense that calls for quotation marks. Indeed, in replaying Marxist canards about "the propertyless" (pp. 189, 199, 208) , Holmes and Sunstein show their small regard for the idea that, as owner of his or her own person, every soul is a property owner.
Holmes and Sunstein do not even begin to test their own grammar. They steer clear of matters in which it is plainly embarrassed -namely, interventionist policies that restrict voluntary actions. In their manner of speaking, practically no federal law is -or could be -4 coercive of innocents or treading on liberty (it would be only if it went against higher level government rules). Drug prohibition does not tread on individual rights but merely reshuffles and redefines rights; incarceration of drug users does not encroach on liberty but enforces rules that the offender voluntarily agreed to by living in America. As though the country were one great university campus.
More than anything else, the book is a pledge of allegiance to modern American go vernment, repeatedly called "the American social contract." Holmes and Sunstein propagate the mythology of collective consent and a reverence for a supposed "shared national venture" (p.
198). Chapters 8 through 11 defend the welfare state against "victimology" charges and "responsibility" concerns. Chapters 13 and 14 try to sell it to taxpayers as a bargain to keep the poor respectful in peacetime and willing in wartime. The book seems to be born of an anxiety that the mythology since FDR of America as a great social organization led by elite university professors and the like is losing some of its sway. Holmes and Sunstein find libertarian notions to be "astonishingly widespread in American culture" (p. 216).
When cultural elites promote the notions that liberty is meaningless and rights are whatever the law says, is it any wonder that they should feel anxious about a lack of shared sentiment with much of the population? Daniel B. Klein Santa Clara University
